For the first time since record keeping began in 1961, annual civilian skydiving fatalities in the U.S. dipped into the single digits, with just nine recorded in 2024. At the same time, the annual total number of jumps has been increasing, with an astonishing 3.88 million skydives conducted in the U.S. based on data received from the USPA membership survey. In 1961, the sport of skydiving was in its infancy with just a smattering of locations around the country where someone could make a parachute jump. Static line was the only training method available, and the Parachute Club of America, the predecessor of the United States Parachute Association, had 3,353 members. There are no records for the number of civilian jumps completed in the United States in 1961, but it’s estimated to have been about 150,000, and the year ended with 14 fatalities. Just two years later, PCA membership had doubled, and fatalities more than doubled at 34. As the sport grew in those early years, so did the fatality count. In the mid-’70s, the annual number of fatalities jumped into the 50s for several years and finally peaked in 1981 with an all-time high of 56 before beginning a slow decline.
Progress in equipment designs and improved training methods helped to improve safety in the 1980s and 1990s, but the fatality rate remained stubbornly in the 30-40 range during those two decades. Then, from 2000-2017, annual fatality counts began a slow but steady decline. Finally, after 57 years, the sport achieved a new low with just 13 fatal accidents in 2018, one less than in 1961. And that wasn’t a fluke. The fatality rate has remained low since 2018 and hit the single-digit milestone for the first time last year.
Placing the data into an index rate provides a steady comparison of fatalities per 100,000 skydives. This helps to see actual risk exposure based on the level of activity, not just a raw number. The good news is that the rate has also been steadily dropping as the volume of jumps continues to increase and the number of fatalities continue to decrease. In 2024, 3.88 million skydives in the U.S. resulted in nine fatalities, or one fatality for every 430,000 skydives, for an index rate of .23 fatalities per 100,000 skydives. In 1961, the index rate was an incredible 40 times higher at 11.1 fatalities per 100,000 skydives.
All this progress stems from a relentless, industry-wide focus on improving the safety of the sport. Manufacturers have made constant design and material improvements to their products. Almost every skydiver is now equipped with an automatic activation device (AAD) and a reserve static line (RSL), with or without a main assisted reserve deployment (MARD) device. AADs and RSLs are two safety devices that have proven to save lives year after year.
Over the last quarter century, USPA has worked tirelessly to improve student training programs, instructional rating programs, examiner rating programs, USPA Safety and Training Advisor education and canopy control education. It has been a never-ending process of evaluating trends and adjusting recommendations, rules and regulations.
Additionally, drop zone owners, Safety and Training Advisors, instructors and coaches are working together to improve the drop zone safety culture across the country. A strong safety culture within the staff at a drop zone influences each skydiver to also work toward staying as safe as possible by remaining vigilant and always placing safety at the forefront.
Even with all these improvements throughout the past six decades, accidents still happen. This annual summary looks at what went wrong in the previous year in hopes that you will learn from what occurred and avoid getting into similar situations. Here, each fatality is placed in the appropriate category, and next to the number of fatalities in each category is the percentage of the total for the year. Following that is the percentage for the previous 20-year period, for comparison.
LANDING PROBLEMS: 4—44.4% (2005-2024—34.5%)
When a skydiver dies while landing a parachute that is fully inflated and functioning normally, it falls into this category. It is comprised of three subcategories: Intentional Low Turn, Unintentional Low Turn, and Non-Turn Related. The fatalities in each of these subcategories have unique causes, with specific training and education required to address them. If a skydiver makes a low turn to build speed for a high-performance landing and strikes the ground hard in a diving turn, it is classified as an intentional low turn. In cases where a skydiver was not intending to make a high-speed landing but makes a sudden low turn near the ground—usually to avoid another parachute, obstacle on the ground or an attempt to face into the wind for landing—the fatality is classified as an unintentional low turn. When a skydiver flying a fully functioning parachute and encounters a problem landing that is not turn-related—such as striking a building or vehicle or encountering a dust devil or strong, turbulent winds—it is categorized as a non-turn related landing problem.
Intentional Low Turn: 2—22.2% (2005-2024—16.8%)
♦ A 42-year-old male with 1,400 jumps and nine years of experience exited a Cessna Caravan and deployed his 84-square-foot cross-braced parachute, which he was loading at 2.4:1. Investigators reported that it was his first jump of the season following several months away from jumping during the winter. The freefall, deployment and initial canopy descent were uneventful. He initiated a 270-degree turn for his final approach into the landing area. The altitude at the start of the turn was not reported, however it was much too low, and he struck an asphalt surface next to the landing area in a steep, diving descent. He continued another 100 feet before coming to a stop in the landing area. He was air-lifted to a local hospital but there was no sign of any brain activity. He was removed from life support the next day and died soon after.
♦ A 38-year-old male with 3,400 jumps and 13 years of experience exited a King Air at 6,000 feet for a practice jump in preparation for a swoop competition. This was his second jump of the day, and he deployed his 84-square-foot cross-braced parachute, which he loaded at 2.6:1, immediately after the exiting. The deployment and initial descent under the parachute were uneventful. Investigators reported that the jumper initiated a 450-degree turn above the swoop pond, and the parachute remained in a steep dive until he struck the water. Several witnesses reported that it appeared to be a normal high-speed approach initiated at an appropriate altitude, but as he got closer to the ground, he never pulled the parachute out of its dive. He was pulled out of the water within 10 seconds and received immediate first aid from trained paramedics, but he did not respond. He was declared dead soon after reaching the hospital.
What This Can Teach Us
♦ Jumping small, highly loaded parachutes and performing high-speed landings greatly increases the risk of experiencing a severe injury or dying. Even with the best coaching, training and practice, there is simply no room for any error, and the results of an error made at high-speed close to the ground are often fatal.
♦ A lack of currency and experience were also contributing factors for one jumper. With just 1,400 jumps spread out over nine years, he likely rapidly downsized and wasn’t very experienced flying a cross-braced, 84-square-foot parachute with such a high (2.4:1) wing loading. Additionally, after months away from skydiving, it would have been safer to fly a more conservative landing approach while easing back into the regular skydiving season.
♦ Parachute manufacturers have made incredible advances in parachute wing design and efficiency. As a result, jumpers have steadily moved toward flying small parachutes at high wing loadings. At almost any drop zone, it’s not unusual to find skydivers flying parachutes loaded at more than 3:1. Not long ago, that high of a wing loading would have been considered extreme, but not so much now. As ultra-high wing loading becomes the new normal, reasonable, lighter wing loadings for those with moderate or low experience is becoming downplayed. The information contained in Skydiver’s Information Manual Chapter 5-9 is still as valid now as it was when it was created many years ago: Canopies smaller than 150 square-feet at any wing loading should be considered advanced.
♦ Training and education for canopy pilots has much improved over the last two decades. However, even with advanced parachute designs and better coaching and training, it is impossible to eliminate the additional risks. Successful execution of a high-performance landing requires nearly flawless depth perception and hand-eye coordination. During a high-performance approach, jumpers can control the recovery arc of the parachute to steepen or flatten the dive if needed. If a turn is initiated too low, the canopy pilot must recognize the error soon enough to stop the turn or flatten the recovery arc while there is still enough altitude remaining to slow the descent rate and land safely.
Unintentional Low Turn: 0—0% (2005-2024-6.8%)
There were no fatalities in this category in 2024.
Non-Turn-Related: 2—22.2% (2005-2024—10.8%)
♦ A 28-year-old female with 4,500 jumps and 12 years of experience exited a Twin Otter at 13,000 feet for a tandem skydive with her student, a 28-year-old female making her first skydive. The temperature was 105 degrees Fahrenheit, and winds were reported to be 10 miles per hour with gusts to 20. The freefall and initial parachute descent were uneventful.
As the tandem pair approached the landing area on a left base leg, they noticed a dust devil—a column of spinning air that resembles a mini-tornado—near them, swirling over the desert terrain beside the grass landing area. The tandem instructor then turned to final approach. Reportedly, it was the first dust devil spotted that day. Witnesses on the ground reported that the tandem turned to the right slightly to continue avoiding the dust devil. At approximately 30-40 feet, the pair encountered either very turbulent air or a second dust devil that was over the grass and not visible. The parachute turned violently to the left and the tandem pair struck the ground at the same time as the parachute. The pair received immediate first aid; however, the tandem instructor was unresponsive and died soon after the impact. The student died in the hospital two days later.
What This Can Teach Us
♦ Dust devils are commonly found in hot and dry desert environments, but they can also be found in any location when conditions are right for their development. Dust devils usually form when the air is warming and winds are light in areas where the ground heats unevenly, such as an asphalt surface next to a grass area. The air heating and rising at different rates can create the tight swirling conditions that generate the dust devil. When dust devils form in the desert, it is easy to spot them because they pick up dust and debris, making them visible. When they form over grass or asphalt, they are often invisible due to the lack of debris.
♦ This tandem pair encountered very turbulent air or possibly an invisible dust devil while they were over the grass landing area, just before landing. A similar fatality occurred in 2014 when a tandem student died and the instructor was seriously injured after the tandem pair flew into an invisible dust devil that had formed over asphalt.
♦ When conditions are favorable for dust devils and they are observed nearby, staying on the ground is the safest option. If you are under canopy and observe dust devils in or near the landing area, choose to land as far as possible from any that you can see. If possible, land in an area where debris would be picked up and make dust devils visible, so you have a chance to steer away and avoid them.
MEDICAL PROBLEM: 1—11% (2005-2024—9.7%)
A fatality falls into this category when a skydiver experiences some sort of medical emergency after exiting the airplane or commits suicide while skydiving due to a mental health issue.
♦ A 47-year-old male with 1,026 jumps and 12 years of experience exited a Cessna Caravan at 14,000 feet on a solo skydive with the intent of making a high pull (deploy his main parachute soon after exit). He was the last skydiver to exit the airplane. Another jumper exited for a group skydive just before this jumper. Shortly after the other jumper deployed his main parachute, he observed this jumper, who appeared to be unresponsive, still in freefall in a back-to-earth position. He continued this way until reaching the ground, where the hard impact killed him instantly.
First responders reported that the jumper’s main-pilot-chute, reserve-ripcord and cutaway handles were in place, and there was no sign that he attempted pulling any of them. The container was not equipped with an AAD. Earlier in the day, he had reported to staff members that he was not feeling well and had soreness in his chest and throat. He was a tandem instructor and elected to not conduct any tandem jumps that day but decided to make a solo skydive despite not feeling well.
What This Can Teach Us
♦ Skydiving places stress on our bodies, increasing the heart rate in an environment where oxygen levels may be reduced. For someone experiencing a heart attack, making a skydive will only make things worse. Chest pain and other upper body discomfort are common symptoms of a heart attack.
♦ Most medical professionals recommend an annual physical for people over the age of 40. For those who may have a family history of heart disease, it is a good idea to consult with a specialist for additional testing.
♦ Using an AAD would have provided a chance for this jumper’s reserve parachute to activate and for first responders to administer first aid. However, with no AAD installed, there was no way to survive the skydive without manually deploying a parachute.
LOW DEPLOYMENT: 1—11.1% (2005-2024—2.9%)
When a skydiver deploys the main or reserve parachute too low for the parachute to fully inflate, the fatality is classified as a low deployment. Widespread use of automatic activation devices (AADs) along with higher main-deployment altitudes have significantly reduced the number of fatalities in this category. This is only the second low-deployment fatality in a decade.
♦ A 36-year-old male with 18 years of skydiving experience and an unreported number of jumps exited a King Air for his second jump of the day. He was wearing a new wingsuit. He was reportedly an experienced wingsuit jumper but was having difficulties controlling the new wingsuit on this jump, as well as during a previous jump that day. Another wingsuit skydiver who was on both jumps observed him struggling to find and deploy the main parachute on those jumps. On this jump, he went unstable while trying to deploy his main canopy and began spinning and tumbling. He was unable to deploy his main parachute. He fell through some trees and struck the ground. The hard impact killed him instantly.
First responders found the freebag and reserve pilot chute next to the body, with the reserve parachute out of the bag but still mostly folded and the slider all the way up. Investigators could not determine whether the jumper pulled the reserve handle or whether it had snagged on a tree branch as he passed through trees. The container was not equipped with an AAD.
What This Can Teach Us
♦ To survive any skydive, a main or reserve parachute must be deployed at an altitude high enough to allow for full inflation. Altitude awareness is critical, especially when encountering difficulties during freefall. Skydiver’s Information Manual Chapter 4.1 states that jumpers must deploy the parachute at the correct altitude and that a stable body position improves the opening reliability, but it is secondary to deploying at the correct altitude.
♦ The container was not equipped with an AAD, which could have activated the reserve parachute at a survivable altitude.
♦ The USPA Basic Safety Requirements state that any person performing a wingsuit jump must have completed at least 200 skydives and hold a current skydiving license. Investigators did not report the number of jumps this jumper had completed, the number of wingsuit jumps he had completed, the type of wingsuit he was attempting to fly or whether he received any training specifically for jumping with a wingsuit. He held a D license, so he had completed at least 500 skydives. To reduce the risk, using a wingsuit requires specialized training and a careful progression towards larger and more complex models. Skydiver’s Information Manual Chapter 5-8—Wingsuit Flying recommends that students who have recently completed wingsuit first-flight courses use wingsuits appropriate for novices and should not use or purchase an expert or advanced wingsuit.
EQUIPMENT PROBLEM: 1—11.1% (2005-2024—12.1%)
When a skydiver experiences a problem with the parachute system or other piece of equipment that leads to a fatality, it falls into this category. The most common causes of fatalities in this category are packing and assembly errors and failure of a component due to age and wear.
♦ A 74-year-old male with 7,113 jumps and 32 years of experience exited a Twin Otter at 13,000 feet as part of a 4-way formation skydive. At an unreported altitude, the formation funneled and broke apart. This jumper and two others rebuilt to a 3-way, but the fourth jumper never redocked on the formation. The breakoff and main parachute deployments were uneventful for all four of the jumpers.
A witness on the ground initially observed all the parachutes flying normally. When she looked back at this jumper a short time later, his main parachute was spinning rapidly and only one riser was attached to his harness. Another jumper under canopy observed the parachute spinning from approximately 2,000 feet and saw the jumper hanging limp in the harness under the spinning canopy for at least the final 1,000 feet. The spin continued until the jumper struck the ground at a high rate of descent. He received immediate medical attention but was unresponsive, and he was declared dead once he reached the hospital.
The jumper’s cutaway handle was found dislodged from his harness with approximately five inches of cutaway cable extracted from the cable housing. The right riser was disconnected from the harness, and the left riser had about an inch of cutaway cable remaining above the retention loop. (The left riser included the reserve static line, and it is common that the cutaway cable on the RSL side is slightly longer than the non-RSL riser. This ensures that during a cutaway, the RSL pulls the reserve ripcord only after both risers have detached from the harness.) Investigators believe that the most likely cause for the dislodged cutaway handle was contact with another jumper when the formation funneled, with the right-riser cutaway cable disconnecting once the jumper released the brakes of his main parachute.
What This Can Teach Us
♦ Funneled skydiving formations and tumbles in freefall are common but usually uneventful. However, it is important to remain vigilant when something like this occurs since it can lead to a handle being dislodged.
♦ Having a spinning canopy is confusing and disorienting and makes it more difficult to find the cutaway handle. It can also cause loss of consciousness. This jumper may have been trying to locate the cutaway handle to complete the cutaway, but lost consciousness soon after the spin began. He also reportedly took medication that can cause dizziness, which may have worsened his situation under the spinning main parachute.
♦ Jumpers must consider how age, physical condition and medications will factor into their skydiving. As we age, reflexes and strength diminish, which can make it difficult to respond to an emergency.
CANOPY COLLISION: 1—11.1% (2005-2024—11.3%)
A fatality falls into this category when two or more skydivers collide while under parachute. The two most common times that canopy collisions occur are during deployment or below 1,000 feet in the landing pattern.
♦ This jumper, a 42-year-old male with 10,500 jumps and 12 years of experience, organized a 5-way angle skydive, leading a group that exited a Cessna Caravan at 13,000 feet. Investigators reported that the skydive was steeper and faster than originally planned, and there was confusion about the breakoff altitude; some of the group thought it was supposed to be 5,500 feet while others thought it was 5,000 feet.
At an unreported altitude, this jumper transitioned from a steep angle to a slower and flatter angle and deployed his main parachute. He presumably did not see that one of the other jumpers in the group—a newer jumper with 102 jumps—was above and behind him. This jumper elected to deploy his own main parachute to avoid the inflating parachute below. However, the two jumpers collided as their main parachutes inflated.
Investigators reported that the impact incapacitated the group organizer and that his main parachute began to spin rapidly. He was limp in the harness and unresponsive for the entire descent, and the canopy continued spinning until he struck the ground. The hard impact killed him instantly. The other jumper suffered a concussion and bruising, but he was able to land uneventfully under his main parachute.
What This Can Teach Us
♦ It is unclear if the breakoff-altitude confusion played a part in the collision, but having and communicating a clear plan for all phases of the skydive makes everyone’s actions more predictable and therefore safer.
♦ Relying on vertical separation to avoid a lower inflating parachute is risky. There is no way to control the speed of the inflation or direction of the deployment. Depending on the situation, it may be safer to remain in freefall and turn just enough to avoid the inflating parachute, then deploy at a lower altitude once in clear airspace.
♦ Organizers must always consider the experience level of each participant as well as the size of the group when organizing angle jumps. Skydiver’s Information Manual Chapter 5-10 recommends that beginners jump in small groups of three or fewer, and the angle of the jump should be kept flat. Once jumpers develop skill and experience, the angle can steepen and the size of the group can increase. Brad Hunt of 1-Point Skydive, an experienced angle skydive organizer, likes to stay conservative when organizing angle jumps in the interest of helping jumpers learn angle flight in as safe an environment as possible. He says, “It’s quite difficult to tell an eager skydiver; ‘No, I don’t think this is the right jump for you.’ However, it’s up to me to help ensure the jumpers in each group I organize have the necessary skill for the degree of difficulty of the planned jump.”
♦ This jumper was equipped with a very small main parachute that placed his wing loading at approximately 3:1. After the initial collision, he may have been unconscious but still alive. However, the rapid spin and high descent rate of a canopy loaded so highly makes the landing impossible to survive.
ENTANGLEMENT: 1—11.1% (2005-2024—2.1%)
When a skydiver dies after a deployed parachute entangles with their body or the main and reserve parachutes entangle together, the fatality is recorded in this category. The most common causes for an entanglement are an unstable body position during the deployment or incorrect emergency procedures.
♦ A 63-year-old male with just over 200 jumps and eight years of experience exited a Cessna 182 for a solo wingsuit skydive. He had recently attended a wingsuit-first-flight course at another drop zone that flew turbine aircraft. This was his first jump with a wingsuit from a Cessna 182. His exit was unstable, and it is unknown whether he tumbled for the entire freefall, but he deployed his main parachute at an unknown altitude while unstable. He entangled with the main parachute and cut away it away, but it remained attached to an unknown part of his body. He deployed the reserve parachute, but it entangled with his body or the main parachute and did not fully deploy. He struck the ground under the entangled and malfunctioned main and reserve parachutes.
What This Can Teach Us
♦ Skydiver’s Information Manual Chapter 4.1 states that deploying a parachute in a stable body position greatly increases the chances of experiencing an uneventful deployment, but it is important to deploy at the correct altitude regardless of stability. History has shown that entanglements following an unstable main parachute deployment are rare, and the most likely results are a normally opening main parachute or a malfunctioned main parachute followed by a successful cutaway and reserve deployment. However, in this case the main parachute entangled with the jumper, and it remained attached to the jumper after the cutaway. Even with a main entanglement, the reserve parachute has a chance of fully inflating after deployment. Unfortunately, the reserve also entangled with the main and was unable to fully inflate.
♦ Wingsuits add complexity to the skydive and deployment process. SIM Chapter 5.8 recommends that wingsuit students receive instruction on how to manage flat spins and tumbling per the wingsuit manufacturer’s recommendations, then practice these procedures on the ground. If the jumper can’t stop the tumble or spin by 6,000 feet, they should deploy the main parachute regardless of stability.
GENERAL COMMENTS
Progressing
Attaining new freefall and canopy skills is all part of advancing in the sport. There is a lot to learn in any new discipline—whether it is formation skydiving, freeflying, wingsuiting or canopy piloting—and it takes time to acquire those new skills. Some people advance faster than others, but it is important to move forward to the next step only when ready. Nearly half of the fatalities in 2024 involved skydivers who got into trouble by trying to advance more quickly than they should have. It is critically important that those who are learning receive mentorship and advice from more experienced skydivers. It’s also important for the mentors to be qualified and to give appropriate advice.
High-Performance Landings and Downsizing
Jumpers downsizing too rapidly to small parachutes has been a constant problem for more than three decades. Whether it is from a lack of mentorship and guidance, bad advice or simply overestimating ability, many skydivers have died from poorly executed high-performance approaches and hard landings. At the same time, there has been a lot of progress toward better training and education for high-performance-parachute flight. However, high-speed landings are always dangerous, even for highly experienced skydivers who have received excellent training and guidance from professional canopy coaches. Over the past 20 years, 64 skydivers died while attempting to make high-performance landings.
Wingsuit Flight
Just as parachute design has advanced greatly in the last 20 years, so has wingsuit design. USPA requires that jumpers have a minimum of 200 skydives in order to use a wingsuit and recommends that they seek training with an experienced wingsuit coach. Those who are new to the discipline should also start with a beginner-level wingsuit before moving toward larger and more complex designs. Each wingsuit manufacturer outlines procedures for recovery from spinning or tumbling. It is critical that jumpers understand those procedures and rehearse them thoroughly.
Backup Devices
Widespread use of automatic activation devices and reserve static lines (with or without a main-assisted reserve deployment device) have greatly improved the safety level of skydiving and reduced the number of fatalities each year. Two of the fatalities in 2024 may have had different outcomes if the parachute systems had been AAD-equipped.
Canopy Collisions
There has been a significant reduction in canopy-collision fatalities, both at deployment time and at pattern altitudes, since the early 2000s. Statistics indicate that training, education and the 2007 rule to separate high-performance canopy traffic from those who are landing with a standard landing pattern have helped to reduce the number of collision fatalities over the years. This year’s deployment-time fatality in this category is the first in seven years, and it has been eight years since there has been a fatality due to collision in the landing pattern.
Unintentional Low Turns
Another area of improvement has been in the category of unintentional low turns. There were no fatalities in this category in 2024. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was not unusual to see four or five fatal accidents per year due to newer jumpers making low turns close to the ground, usually trying to face into the wind, avoid another jumper under canopy or avoid an obstacle on the ground. Those jumpers were almost always flying a parachute that was too small for their experience level, and they did not have a solid understanding of how to fly them. The canopy training and education that has been incorporated into the Integrated Student Program and the B-license requirements have combined to help new skydivers learn more about parachute flight and make better decisions when it comes to flying and landing a parachute.
Even though there were a record low number of fatalities this year, each one was a tragedy, and the families and friends of those who are lost are forever affected. So, while celebrating the achievement, those in the sport continue to work to improve the safety of everyone who makes a skydive, whether it is a first-time tandem student or a veteran of the sport with thousands of skydives. USPA continues to work toward improving the student, instructor and examiner training programs. The Parachute Industry Association and equipment manufacturers continue to improve the gear. Drop zone owners work hard to cultivate a safety culture on the drop zone that helps every staff member and skydiver focus on safety. Examiners, instructors and coaches have worked tirelessly to create safer and smarter skydivers who put safety at the forefront of every skydive. All these efforts are making a difference, and every skydiver across the country can be proud of their efforts to make the sport of skydiving safer than it has ever been.
About the Author
Jim Crouch-D-16979, was USPA Director of Safety and Training from 2000-2018. He has written the annual fatality summary for Parachutist since 2019. He now spends his time happily flying other people’s airplanes for aerial survey flights.